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ABSTRACT
U.S. privacy laws are increasingly moving from a presumption that
consumers must object to ("opt out" of) uses of personal data they
wish to prohibit to a requirement that they must explicitly consent
("opt in") to uses they wish to permit. Despite the growing reliance on
opt-in rules, there has been little empirical research on their costs.
This Article examines the impact of opt-in on MBNA Corporation, a
diversified, multinational financial institution. The authors demon-
strate that opt-in would raise account acquisition costs and lower
profits, reduce the supply of credit and raise credit card prices, gener-
ate more offers to uninterested or unqualified consumers, raise the
number of missed opportunities for qualified consumers, and impair
efforts to prevent fraud. These costs would be incurred despite the fact
that as of the end of 2000, only about two percent of MBNA's cus-
tomers had taken advantage of existing voluntary opportunities to opt
out of receiving MBNA's direct mail marketing offers. If Congress
were to adopt opt-in laws applicable to financial information, the im-
pact across the economy on consumers and businesses would be sig-
nificant.
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INTRODUCTION
The free flow of information has become a defining characteristic
of the New Economy in the United States.1 Economists have long
recognized that the costs of acquiring information and arranging
transactions are like sand in the gears of commerce.2 Markets function
more efficiently when it is less costly to identify and design the right
product for the right consumer and deliver it at the right time. Many
1. The phrase “free flow of information” throughout this Article refers to personally iden-
tifiable information flowing between consumers and companies, among affiliated and nonaffili-
ated companies, and to and from public record repositories.
2. For the seminal article on the role of information costs, see George J. Stigler, The Eco-
nomics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 213–25 (1961).
CATE IN FINAL READ.DOC 07/30/03  2:51 PM
2003] OPT-IN PRIVACY RULES 747
of the factors underlying the remarkable growth in productivity dur-
ing the 1990s, including just-in-time delivery, total quality manage-
ment, and electronic commerce, are a consequence of advances in in-
formation technology that support the rapid acquisition and transfer
of information.
The financial services sector has benefited substantially from
these advances in information technology, especially through the in-
dustry’s use of personally identifiable information. As Comptroller of
the Currency John Hawke, Jr., testified before Congress in 1999, the
financial services market is an “information-driven industry . . . . In-
formation exchanges thus serve a useful and critical market function
that benefits consumers and financial institutions alike, in facilitating
credit, investment, insurance and other financial transactions.”3
Much of that essential information relates to individuals and
their specific transactions. Notwithstanding the resulting benefits,
surveys over the past decade document that consumers have become
increasingly sensitive about the collection and commercial use of per-
sonal information (financial and otherwise) by businesses. In a 1999
IBM/Harris survey, 94 percent of Americans said they were worried
about “possible misuse” of their personal information, and 80 percent
thought that “consumers have lost all control over how personal in-
formation about them is collected and used by companies.”4 Con-
sumer surveys suggest a growing demand for privacy, as that term re-
fers to the ability to control or conceal the use of information about
oneself, at least in certain circumstances.5
The explicit assignment of property rights to the use of personal
information in U.S. law has lagged far behind the development of
technology to capture and transfer such information, but it is begin-
3. Financial Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of
the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. (1999), 1999 WL 528367 (statement
of John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency).
4. Alan F. Westin, Intrusions: Privacy Tradeoffs in a Free Society, PUB. PERSPECTIVE,
Nov./Dec. 2000, at 9.
5. The concept of privacy utilized throughout this Article follows the definition first posed
by Professor Alan Westin in 1967: informational privacy is “the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them
is communicated to others.” ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). Subse-
quently, Professor George Stigler examined the economics of “concealment of information”
that may have value in sorting individuals and matching preferences and opportunities. George
J. Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 624
(1980) (exploring the nature of privacy in economic behavior, the economic effects of contem-
porary privacy policies, and the reasons for the enactment of privacy legislation).
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ning to catch up.6 With a few exceptions, until the late 1990s, firms
were legally able to use and exchange most customer and transaction
data. The primary constraint on information exchange was the threat
of alienating privacy-sensitive customers. Judging from consumer pri-
vacy surveys, market discipline in the form of potential customer at-
trition over privacy issues has grown steadily throughout the past
decade, making that constraint more binding. Over the past five
years, the concept that consumers should have the legal right to exer-
cise some degree of choice over commercial use of personal informa-
tion has become an accepted principle underpinning public policy to-
ward privacy in the United States.7 However, the form in which that
choice must be offered is far from settled.
One approach to giving consumers control over how data about
them is used is an “opt-out” system. Under opt-out, consent to a
specified use of information may be inferred from the fact that an en-
tity gave the consumer notice of the intended use and an opportunity
to restrict it, but the consumer did not object. In those industries in
the United States, where laws currently mandate that consumers be
given a choice, opt-out is the consent system most commonly used.8
However, legislation being proposed with increasing frequency at
both the federal and state levels would require that firms obtain ex-
plicit consent from individuals before collecting, using or exchanging
6. In keeping with recent U.S. privacy legislation, we use the term “personal information”
to refer to any data relating to a specific individual, unless those data are routinely available
from public sources, such as telephone directories.
7. See Internet Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Commerce Comm., 107th Cong. (2001), 2001
WL 21756980 (statement of Fred H. Cate, Professor, Indiana University School of Law—
Bloomington) (noting that “the dominant trend in . . . privacy legislation is to invest consumers
with near absolute control over” personal information).
8. For examples of federal statutes and regulations adopting the opt-out approach, see the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 502, 113 Stat. 1338, 1437–40 (1999) (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (setting forth a financial institution’s obligations regarding dis-
closure of personal information); Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(e)
(2000) (allowing the consumer to elect to have the consumer’s name and address excluded from
consumer reporting agency lists); Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3)
(2000) (concerning residential telephone subscribers’ right to avoid receiving objectionable
telephone solicitations); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e) (2002) (restricting telephone solicitation). In
contrast, individually identifiable health information is increasingly subjected to opt-in rules,
like those found in recent federal health privacy rules. See, e.g., Standards for Privacy of Indi-
vidually Identifiable Health Information, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502, 164.506 (2002) (allowing health
care organizations to use or disclose legislatively protected, individually identifiable health in-
formation with the individual’s consent).
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information about them.9 Such “opt-in” rules have already been in-
corporated into many European data protection laws,10 and have been
adopted in federal regulations11 and local ordinances.12
Despite the widespread debate over, and growing reliance on,
opt-in rules, there has been little empirical research on the costs of
opt-in and differences, if any, between, the cost of opt-in and opt-out
systems. Policymakers are increasingly considering, and in some in-
stances adopting, opt-in rules without any sense of their practical im-
pact on consumers, business, or the economy.
Research about the relative costs of opt-in versus opt-out rules
would be irrelevant in a world of costless transactions. A Coasian
view of bargaining over the rights to use personally identifiable in-
formation concludes that if negotiating and contracting is costless, the
usage rights will accrue to the party with the greatest value, regardless
of the initial assignment.13 That is to say, if the consumer places a suf-
9. For examples of federal opt-in legislation introduced during the 107th Congress, see the
Consumer’s Right to Financial Privacy Act, H.R. 2720, 107th Cong. (2001); Privacy Act of 2001,
S. 1055, 107th Cong. (2001); Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2001, H.R. 718,
107th Cong. (2001); Online Personal Privacy Act, S. 2201, 107th Cong. (2001); Financial Institu-
tion Privacy Protection Act of 2001, S. 450, 107th Cong. (2001); Consumer Online Privacy and
Disclosure Act, H.R. 347, 107th Cong. (2001); Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of
2001, H.R. 95, 107th Cong. (2001). For examples of recently introduced state opt-in legislation,
see S.B. 1258, 45th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2002) (relating to consumer information privacy); Fi-
nancial Privacy Protection Act of 2002, A.B. 1775, 2001–02 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002); H.F. 285, 79th
Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2001) (relating to disclosure of consumer information by financial
institutions); Consumer Privacy Act, S.B. 2988, 224th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); Consumer Internet
Privacy Act, S.B. 4402, 224th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); S.B. 1547, 48th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2001)
(prohibiting disclosure of certain information relating to insurance).
10. See, e.g., European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data, art. 7, 1995 O.J. (L 281), LEXSEE 1995 OJ L 281 [hereinafter European Parliament and
Council Directive 95/46/EC] (establishing that personal data may not be “processed” without
the subject’s unambiguous consent).
11. See, e.g., Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45
C.F.R. §§ 164.502, 164.506 (2002) (requiring health care providers to obtain consent from pa-
tients before using or disclosing certain protected health information).
12. See, e.g., CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, CAL., CODE ch. 518-4 (2002) (requiring financial
institutions to obtain consent before sharing customer information); Daly City, Cal., Ordinance
1295 (Sept. 9, 2002) (requiring notice and consent prior to disclosure of confidential consumer
information by financial institutions); Daly City, Cal., Ordinance 1297 (Nov. 12, 2002) (same);
S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGS. CODE art. 20 (2002) (providing protection of private financial
information); San Mateo County, Cal., Ordinance 4126 (Aug. 6, 2002) (regulating the disclosure
of confidential consumer information), San Mateo County, Cal., Ordinance 4144 (Nov. 5, 2002)
(same).
13. For a development of a Coasian framework for examining the allocation of privacy
rights, see CHARLES M. KAHN ET AL., A THEORY OF TRANSACTION PRIVACY (Fed. Reserve
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ficiently high value on privacy, she can pay the company a sum suffi-
cient to persuade it not to transfer the information to a third party
(or, possibly, to discourage the reuse of the information by the com-
pany itself in preparing subsequent marketing messages). Possibly
this payment could be in the form of foregone discounts that are oth-
erwise available to consumers who consent to subsequent usage.
Where corporations incur positive costs to contract for the use of
information, the initial assignment of rights and rules governing in-
formation usage has economic consequences. In this Article, we dem-
onstrate that although the opt-in versus opt-out approaches sound
similar, they differ dramatically in their practical impact on, and eco-
nomic consequences for, both companies and individuals. The fol-
lowing case study assesses the impact of requiring a large U.S.-based
financial services provider to obtain explicit consent from consumers
before using personal information about them. We conclude that opt-
in requirements mandated uniformly across the U.S. economy could
threaten the viability of key services and products offered by U.S. fi-
nancial services companies.
To illustrate the costs of moving to an opt-in system, we examine
MBNA Corporation, a financial institution that offers consumers a
variety of loan and insurance products (primarily credit cards), takes
deposits, but operates entirely without a branch network. Incorpo-
rated in 1981 and publicly traded since 1991, the company has com-
piled a stunning growth record in just two decades. As of the end of
2000, the company provided credit cards and other loan products to
51 million consumers, had $89 billion of loans outstanding, and serv-
iced 15 percent of all Visa/MasterCard credit card balances out-
standing in the United States.14
MBNA’s ability to access and use information about potential
and existing customers is largely responsible for it becoming the sec-
ond largest credit card issuer in the United States in less than twenty
years.15 To appreciate the critical role that the sharing of information
has played in MBNA’s remarkable history, one need only reflect on
the challenge of acquiring 51 million customers with no brick-and-
mortar stores or branches. Like firms in a variety of businesses, but
especially financial services, MBNA harnessed information technol-
Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2000-22, 2000). That article relies on insights first posited
in Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
14. MBNA CORP., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 6–7 (2001).
15. THOMSON MEDIA, CARD INDUSTRY DIRECTORY 42 (2003).
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ogy as the engine for establishing and building customer relationships
without ever physically meeting its customers. By using direct mail,
telephone and, most recently, Internet contacts, the company has
reached out to new prospects throughout the population, regardless
of where they live, with offers tailored to their individual interests.
Part I of this Article discusses how MBNA currently uses per-
sonal information to bring products and services to existing customers
and new prospects. Part II examines the opt-in versus opt-out debate,
and the practical experience of U.S. companies with opt-out systems,
in greater detail. Against this backdrop, in Part III, we examine the
implications of opt-in rules that would restrict the flow of personal in-
formation into MBNA from external sources, and within MBNA
through artificial barriers to sharing across affiliates. Through a series
of specific examples we illustrate how opt-in laws neutralize many of
the productivity gains generated by advances in information technol-
ogy. These examples are cast specifically in terms of MBNA’s prod-
ucts, services and customers, but most are also typical of the opera-
tions of the top ten credit card issuers who collectively held over 80
percent of the $605 billion in bank credit card receivables outstanding
in the United States as of the end of 2001.16 Consequently, the lessons
learned from examining the impact of opt-in on MBNA can be gen-
eralized across the credit card and financial services industries, and,
more generally, to any business that substitutes information for physi-
cal contact in developing a customer base.
I.  THE MBNA EXPERIENCE
A. Free-Flowing Information Transformed the Credit Card Industry
The credit card industry provides a compelling example of the
power of information-sharing to transform a market, expand con-
sumer choice, enhance service, and lower prices. MBNA was one of
the leading players contributing to that transformation. Through the
late 1970s, the majority of credit cards were provided to consumers
through their local financial institutions. Choice was limited to issuers
who happened to offer a card product through a local bank or other
financial institution. Customers in smaller towns had fewer choices
than residents of large cities. Local institutions faced little competi-
tion from financial institutions from other states or regions, and so
16. Id. at 17.
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had little incentive to offer new card products, new services or lower
prices.17
All of this began to change in the early 1980s. A key Supreme
Court decision in 1978 gave national banks the ability to launch na-
tional credit card marketing programs at far lower cost than before.18
The ability to acquire information about potential cardholders—irre-
spective of location—made it possible for companies to enter new
geographic markets, often with astounding speed.19 Both the estab-
lished full-service banks with credit card programs, such as Citibank,
Bank of America, First Chicago, Chase, and upstart, branchless,
“monoline” entrants, like MBNA, Providian, First USA, and, later,
Capital One, began national marketing campaigns.20 These issuers
used credit reports and other externally acquired information to iden-
tify and target low-risk borrowers for their low-rate cards throughout
the United States.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, retailers and manufacturers, such as
Sears (Discover card), General Motors, AT&T, and General Electric
also began introducing their own “co-branded” bank credit cards as
unique alternatives to the traditional Visa and MasterCard products
being offered by banks.21 These entrants combined data about existing
customers of their corporate affiliates with information from credit
reports and other external sources to identify and reach likely pros-
17. For further discussion of competitive conditions in credit card markets, see
CHRISTOPHER R. KNITTEL & VICTOR STANGO, PRICE CEILINGS AS FOCAL POINTS FOR TACIT
COLLUSION: EVIDENCE FROM CREDIT CARDS (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi. Working Paper No.
WP2001-12, 2001).
18. See Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299,
310 (1978) (holding that the solicitation and extension of credit to residents of a foreign State
does not change the State in which the bank is “located” under Section 85 of the National
Banking Act of 1864).
19. Following its introduction in 1992, the General Motors MasterCard established two
million accounts and more than $500 million of balances in its first sixty days, making it the most
successful credit card launch in U.S. history. The GM card rollout eclipsed the record set previ-
ously by the AT&T Universal card, which had opened one million accounts seventy-eight days
after its launch in 1990. As further evidence that the GM card reached its targeted audience, the
company reported that its cardholders were using the GM card 12 times per month, versus an
industry average of 3.5 times monthly, and the average purchase was $112, versus an industry
average of $58. Martin Dickson, Record Take-up for GM Card, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 17,
1992, at 26.
20. John M. Barron & Michael E. Staten, The Value of Comprehensive Credit Reports: Les-
sons from the U.S. Experience, in CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEMS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY (Margaret Miller ed., forthcoming 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
21. DAVID EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL
REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 74–75 (1999).
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pects. Many of these new products came without an annual fee and
provided cash rebates or free products and services each year de-
pending upon charge volume. Other new versions of the bank credit
card product, including those offered by MBNA, allowed consumers
to demonstrate loyalty to, and generate financial support for, an alma
mater or professional organization by using cards embossed with the
institution’s logo. Thanks to the success of those new market entrants,
cards offering frequent traveler miles, rebates and other consumer
benefits have become commonplace.
The wave of new entrants to the bankcard market put great
downward pressure on the finance charge rate and annual fees
charged by existing issuers. In ways to be described in the following
Sections, accessible third-party data, credit bureau data (authorized
by the Fair Credit Reporting Act), and data about the existing cus-
tomers of corporate affiliates made it possible for new entrants to
identify and target low-risk borrowers for their low-rate cards wher-
ever they were located. Competitors knew no borders. Existing issu-
ers began to lose many of their customers—including their lowest
risk, most profitable ones—to national competitors.22 All of this was
possible because information that signaled which consumers had the
potential to become new cardholders negated some of the advantages
of the incumbent issuers.23 Information about existing and potential
customers therefore facilitated national competition among card issu-
ers, the entry of new issuers, and the development of new card prod-
ucts and options.
Incumbent issuers were forced to make a choice: either (1) leave
their rate unchanged and risk defection of their best customers to the
new, low-rate entrants, or (2) cut finance charge rates and fees. In late
1991, to slow customer defections, American Express became the first
22. For a description of the attrition pressures that led to rate cuts by incumbent issuers in
response to the wave of new entrants, see Citibank Leads an Exodus from High Interest Rates,
CREDIT CARD NEWS, May 1, 1992, 1992 WL 2711864; David B. Hilder & Peter Pae, Rivalry
Rages Among Big Credit Cards, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1991, at B1; Peter Pae, Credit Cards: Suc-
cess of AT&T’s Universal Card Puts Pressure on Big Banks to Reduce Rates, WALL ST. J., Feb.
4, 1992, at B1; Leah Nathans Spiro, How AT&T Skimmed the Cream Off the Credit-Card Mar-
ket, BUS. WK., Dec. 16, 1991, at 104; A. Charlene Sullivan, The Push for Tiered-Rate Cards,
CREDIT CARD MANAGEMENT, Oct. 1990, at 81.
23. For general discussions about the impact on competition and pricing of new entrants
into the credit card business, see generally Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel, Antitrust and
Payment Technologies, REVIEW (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis), Nov./Dec. 1995, at 41;
Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel, The Antitrust Economics of Credit Card Networks, 63
ANTITRUST L.J. 643 (1995).
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major issuer to unveil a tiered pricing structure. Holders of American
Express’ Optima card with a high charge volume and no delinquency
in the previous twelve months, received a low 12.5 percent rate on
their revolving balances, well below the average 18 to 20 percent rates
typically charged. This was the beginning of sophisticated risk-based
pricing within major credit card portfolios. Shortly thereafter, Citi-
bank announced a similar pricing structure for its Classic cardholders,
who had been paying 19.8 percent. Citibank officials estimated that,
by the end of 1992, nine million Citibank Classic cardholders would
benefit from the new tiered rate structure.24 The proportion of all re-
volving balances in the United States being charged an APR greater
than 18.0 percent plummeted from 70 percent to 44 percent in just
twelve months (see Figure 1).
The ability of new entrants to use personal information to estab-
lish and cultivate relationships with customers thousands of miles
away has transformed the competitive landscape in the United States,
injecting intense price and service competition into the credit card
24. Citibank Leads an Exodus from High Interest Rates, supra note 22; see also Hilder &
Pae, supra note 22, at B1 (discussing how Chemical moved to a variable rate plan for its credit
card holders); Sullivan, supra note 22, at 81 (referring to the adoption of a tiered interest rate
system by credit card companies).
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market, which had not been historically noted for either.25 Economists
Richard Schmalensee and David Evans reinforce this point:
The industry has expanded robustly in the past twenty years. Output
measured by the number of cards issued, the amount charged on
cards, and the amount of charges that are financed, has risen dra-
matically. Prices, measured by the average revenue issuers receive
after adjusting for charge-offs, have fallen. . . . The expansion of this
industry has taken place through both the continual entry of new is-
suers and the growth of existing ones.26
Regarding the choices now available to consumers as a result of
national marketing campaigns, Schmalensee and Evans further ob-
serve that
[a] 1998 Federal Reserve System survey of 148 of the largest credit
card issuers in the United States found that seventy-two issuers dis-
tribute their cards nationally. . . . Consumers in Chicago, for in-
stance, can therefore obtain cards from more than seventy national
issuers in addition to many more local and regional issuers. Con-
sumers have more choice in their credit card issuer than they have
for many other services. For example, in Chicago a typical consumer
can choose among fifteen grocery store chains, twenty-seven health
maintenance organizations, and eighty-two national or regional
newspapers.27
Tiered, risk-based pricing according to portfolio segment has
made it possible for any given company to serve a broad range of cus-
tomers. “Many card issuers that in the past offered programs with a
single interest rate now offer a broad range of card plans with differ-
ing rates depending on credit risk and consumer usage patterns.”28
25. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board, Remarks to the Charlotte Cham-
ber of Commerce (July 10, 1998), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1998/19
980710.htm:
Once again, perhaps the most profound development has been the rapid growth of
computer and telecommunications technology. The advent of such technology has
lowered the cost and broadened the scope of financial services. These developments
have made it increasingly possible for borrowers and lenders to transact directly and
for a wide variety of financial products to be tailored for very specific purposes. As a
result, competitive pressures in the financial services industry are probably greater
than ever before.
26. DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC 246 (2000).
27. Id. at 225.
28. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE PROFITABILITY OF CREDIT
CARD OPERATIONS OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 6 (2001), http://www.federalreserve.gov
boarddocs/rptCongress. The report also notes that “credit card interest rates fell sharply from
mid-1991 through early 1994 after being relatively stable for most of the previous twenty years.”
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Consequently, new entrants not only triggered a dramatic reduction
in credit card pricing to lower-risk customers, but also substantially
broadened access to the bank credit card product to millions of
higher-risk households. Figure 2 illustrates the dramatic increase in
the percentage of U.S. households owning at least one bankcard be-
tween 1983 and 1998. The largest increases in card ownership oc-
curred in the lower income segments of the population.
MBNA is the epitome of the new credit card entrant, and it has
succeeded better than most. MBNA was incorporated in Delaware in
1981 as the credit card subsidiary of Maryland National Bank with an
initial base of 600 thousand credit card accounts and $209 million in
Id. at 6. The decline in the average “most common interest rate” on issuer credit card plans be-
tween 1991 and 1994 was 244 basis points. Id. at 8 tbl. 2. “Since early 1994, credit card interest
rates have fluctuated in a narrow range between 14.32 and 16.25 percent. For 2000, credit card
interest rates averaged 14.91 percent, the second consecutive year such rates have averaged be-
low 15 percent.” Id. at 6.
Bank Card Ownership by Household Income**
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Income Deciles
Pe
rc
en
t o
f H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
1983 1998
Figure 2
**Percent of households with at least one bank card.
  Source: Fed. Reserve Bd., Survey of Consumer Finances: 1998 Survey Data, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
  pubs/oss/oss2/98/scf98home.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2003); Fed. Reserve Bd., Survey of Consumer Finances:
  1983 Survey Data, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/98/scf83home.html (last visited Mar. 30,
  2003).
CATE IN FINAL READ.DOC 07/30/03  2:51 PM
2003] OPT-IN PRIVACY RULES 757
receivables.29 The company grew to 7 million accounts during its first
decade. Following its initial public offering in 1991, the customer base
grew from 7 million to 51 million during its second decade, with $89
billion of receivables at the end of 2000. Not only did millions of
MBNA cardholders gain access to a versatile credit card product, but
the threat of losing business to companies like MBNA put competi-
tive pressure on the incumbent card issuers in the industry to lower
their prices and broaden their product selection, benefiting all card-
holding consumers.
B. Personal Information as the Cornerstone of the MBNA Strategy
The slogan on the cover of MBNA’s 2000 Annual Report sum-
marizes the company’s strategic plan: “Success is getting the right cus-
tomers and keeping them.”30 Like most major credit card issuers to-
day, MBNA identifies prospects, establishes relationships, anticipates
customer needs, and provides personalized service, but does all this
without meeting its customers in person. How does it find new pros-
pects and service existing customers without branches or stores?
At the core of its marketing and targeting strategies is the propo-
sition that consumers who share a common institutional bond or ex-
perience will have an affinity for using a card that lets them demon-
strate their affiliation each time they use it to pay for a purchase. The
affinity for the institution raises the probability that a prospect will be
converted to a customer. Equally important, the institution or organi-
zation usually maintains a list of members on which MBNA can focus
its marketing efforts. Following this “affinity group” marketing strat-
egy, MBNA designs a card product tailored to members of a particu-
lar group, negotiates a financial arrangement with the organization
for the exclusive rights to market an affinity card to its members, and
uses the member list as a source of potential names to contact via di-
rect mail or telemarketing.
Over 4,700 affinity organizations endorse MBNA products to
their members and receive financial benefits from the company in re-
turn.31 A sampling of that list includes:
29. Historical data on the growth of MBNA accounts and receivables were provided by
MBNA. Interviews with MBNA America executives, in Wilmington, Del. (Dec. 11, 2000) (on
file with the authors).
30. MBNA CORP., supra note 14, at 10.
31. Id.
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• the professional organization sector of the card portfolio in-
cludes over 1,400 professional organizations. The company
reports that MBNA affinity cards are carried in the United
States by 72 percent of all physicians, 68 percent of all den-
tists, 59 percent of all nurses, 53 percent of all lawyers, and 52
percent of all engineers;32
• nearly 4 million alumni and students of over 700 colleges and
universities use MBNA products endorsed by their alumni
associations or schools;33
• 9.1 million people carry MBNA credit cards featuring their
favorite sports teams, racecar drivers or other sports-related
activities;34
• hundreds of affinity programs have been created for people
with a common interest but no formal organization (e.g.,
“Don’t Mess with Texas” card; Irish-American heritage
card).35
Design of new affinity cards is an ongoing process. In 2000 alone,
MBNA acquired the endorsements of 459 new groups, including the
United States Tennis Association, the Atlanta Braves, National
Audubon Society, barnesandnoble.com, and the Thurgood Marshall
Scholarship Fund.36
Although targeting prospects through affinity groups has proven
to be a clever strategy, not every group member is offered a card
product. The key to the company’s profitability and earnings growth,
especially given the rapid growth in the size of the customer base, has
been in screening the prospects from each affinity group to identify
those likely to be quality customers. Given that MBNA’s fundamen-
tal business is lending money via an unsecured credit card with a re-
volving line of credit attached, the company wants to put the card in
the hands of customers who will use it, but who will not default on
32. MBNA CORP., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2002).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. MBNA CORP., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2000).
36. MBNA CORP., supra note 14, at 4. It should also be noted that although MBNA has no
bank branches of its own, its products are marketed in more than twelve thousand bank offices
around the United States and United Kingdom through the endorsement of several hundred
financial institutions for whom it was more economical to contract out the credit card product
rather than to offer it themselves. The financial institution “affinity” sector of the portfolio in-
cludes several million customers. Id. at 10–11.
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their balances. Consequently, MBNA uses information to screen
prospects both before it makes card offers (the targeting process) and
after it receives applications (the underwriting process).
The combination of affinity marketing and stringent underwrit-
ing means that consumers are more likely to be offered products that
are appropriate for themand that fewer consumers are bothered
with offers that are inappropriate for them. Across the entire portfo-
lio, MBNA customers carry balances about 52 percent higher than
the industry average ($3,519 for MBNA versus $2,311 industry-wide),
and have an average transaction size 30 percent higher than the in-
dustry average ($129 per card use for MBNA versus $99 industry-
wide).37 At the same time, the portfolio delinquency rate was 4.49
percent, and net credit losses at the end of 2000 were 4.39 percent of
average managed receivables,38 both well below the credit card indus-
try average delinquency rate of 4.91 percent and charge-off rate of
6.67 percent.39
By the end of 2000, MBNA had experienced forty consecutive
quarters of growth in earnings per share.40 Standard and Poor re-
ported that MBNA had the best five-year annualized return of any
bank in the S&P 500. CIO magazine named MBNA one of the top
100 companies in the United States for excellence in management and
strategic use of technology.41 For the year 2000, Business Week gave
MBNA its fourth consecutive best-in-industry rank and inclusion in
the Business Week 50, an annual ranking of America’s best perform-
ing companies.42 However, the ultimate testament to the viability of
the MBNA business model for delivering value to consumers is that
the number of customers using the company’s products and services
has grown from several hundred thousand to over fifty million in just
eighteen years. Through the responsible use of personal information,
MBNA has not only built itself into one of the United States’ most
successful financial services companies, meeting the needs of more
37. Id. at 9.
38. Id. at 28.
39. William A. Black & Christophe Germain, Credit Card Indexes: December 2000
MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV. CREDIT SURVEY, Feb. 9, 2001, at 1 (noting that these calculations
are based on its rating of $325 billion of securitized credit card receivables).
40. MBNA CORP., supra note 14, at 5.
41. 100 Leaders for the New Millennium: The Honorees, CIO MAG., Aug. 15, 1999,
www.cio.com/archive/081599_chart.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
42. Amy Barrett et al., The 50 Best Performers, BUS. WK., Mar. 27, 2000, at 124 (ranking
credit card issuer MBNA Corporation as thirty-fifth on this list).
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than 50 million customers; it has also contributed significantly to in-
creasing the availability and lowering the price of retail credit for all
consumers.
II.  DIMENSIONS OF THE OPT-IN VERSUS OPT-OUT DEBATE
A. Opt-In Regimes
A common theme that implicitly runs through both federal and
state laws in the United States is that governmental privacy protec-
tions are only permitted when they target specific types of informa-
tion and providers, and where a balancing test can be reasonably con-
strued to warrant government intervention. The Supreme Court has
struck down many ordinances that would require affirmative consent
before receiving door-to-door solicitations,43 before receiving Com-
munist literature,44 even before receiving “patently offensive” cable
programming.45 The words of the Court in the first case—involving a
local ordinance that banned door-to-door solicitations without af-
firmative householder consent—are particularly apt:
Whether such visiting shall be permitted has in general been deemed
to depend upon the will of the individual master of each household,
and not upon the determination of the community. In the instant
case, the City of Struthers, Ohio, has attempted to make this deci-
sion for all its inhabitants.46
The Tenth Circuit reached precisely the same conclusion in 1999,
when the court struck down the Federal Communications Commis-
sion’s (FCC) opt-in rule for the use of telephone subscriber informa-
tion.47 The appellate court found that the FCC’s rules were subject to
First Amendment review because, by limiting the use of personal in-
formation when communicating with customers, they restricted U.S.
West’s speech. Although the court applied intermediate scrutiny, it
determined that under the First Amendment, the rules were pre-
sumptively unconstitutional unless the FCC could prove otherwise by
demonstrating that the rules were necessary to prevent a “specific and
43. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943).
44. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965).
45. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 733 (1996).
46. Martin, 319 U.S. at 141.
47. U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
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significant harm on individuals,” and that the rules were “‘no more
extensive than necessary to serve [the stated] interests.’”48
Although we may feel uncomfortable knowing that our personal in-
formation is circulating in the world, we live in an open society
where information may usually pass freely. A general level of dis-
comfort from knowing that people can readily access information
about us does not necessarily rise to the level of a substantial state
interest for it is not based on an identified harm.49
The court found that for the FCC to demonstrate that the opt-in
rules were sufficiently narrowly tailored, it must prove that less re-
strictive opt-out rules would not offer sufficient privacy protection,
and it must do so with more than mere speculation:
Even assuming that telecommunications customers value the privacy
of [information about their use of the telephone], the FCC record
does not adequately show that an opt-out strategy would not suffi-
ciently protect customer privacy. The respondents merely speculate
that there are a substantial number of individuals who feel strongly
about their privacy, yet would not bother to opt-out if given notice
and the opportunity to do so. Such speculation hardly reflects the
careful calculation of costs and benefits that our commercial speech
jurisprudence requires.50
The court found that the FCC had failed to show why more bur-
densome opt-in rules were necessary, and therefore struck down the
rules as unconstitutional. The fact that the information was being
used for purposes other than publication was irrelevant. The Supreme
Court declined to review the case.51
Despite the constitutional issues that opt-in raises, opt-in pro-
posals aimed at providers of financial services have proliferated in re-
cent years at both the federal and state levels. Proposed opt-in laws
take many forms. Indeed, one of the problems muddying the ongoing
debate over opt-in and opt-out is a lack of specificity about the scope
of coverage (i.e., exactly what types of information sharing and usage
is the consumer being given the opportunity to approve). For pur-
poses of this study we discuss examples that illustrate the impact of
three distinct and successively more restrictive opt-in regimes. The
48. Id. at 1235, 1238 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 486 (1995)).
49. Id. at 1235.
50. Id. at 1239.
51. US West Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 528 U.S. 1188 (2000).
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three regimes described below are points along a continuum of rules
that range from no restrictions on the sharing of personal information
at one extreme to explicit consumer permission for the use of any
kind of personal information at the opposite extreme. Elements of
each of these regimes can be found in laws already enacted in the
United States and Europe and in major proposals for new opt-in leg-
islation currently pending before state legislatures and Congress.
1. Opt-In Regime OneThird-Party-Sharing Opt-In. The least
restrictive set of rules that we consider are opt-in laws that would
permit an organization’s internal use of personal information about
customers or members, but would require opt-in consent before per-
sonal information could be disclosed to third parties outside the or-
ganization. This type of opt-in can be found in bipartisan proposals
that would amend the privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Blilely
Financial Services Modernization Act (the GLB Act) that cover the
use of personal information by financial institutions.52 A similar appli-
cation of opt-in principles governing data sharing with third parties
has been suggested in a number of states for businesses other than fi-
nancial institutions. Opt-in limits on certain kinds of public records
have also been proposed or enacted, such as the 1999 amendments to
the federal Drivers Privacy Protection Act.53 Those amendments gen-
erally prohibit state motor vehicle departments from disclosing in-
formation from motor vehicle registration records (such as owner’s
age and the type of car owned) without first obtaining opt-in consent.
As we explain in the next Section, the adoption of opt-in rules for
third-party sharing would affect MBNA mostly by reducing or elimi-
nating certain types of information from external sources upon which
the company depends.
2. Opt-In Regime TwoAffiliate Sharing Opt-In. Moving to-
ward the more restrictive end of the spectrum, the second opt-in re-
52. Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 501–527, 113 Stat. 1338, 1436–50
(1999) (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The list of organizations covered under the
GLB Act as financial institutions is broad. It includes regulated financial companies such as
banks, securities firms, insurance companies, insurance agencies, thrifts, and credit unions, as
well as other institutions “the business of which is engaging in financial activities,” 15 U.S.C. §
6809(3)(A) (2000), such as finance companies, mortgage brokers and check cashers. So, for ex-
ample, retailers with credit programs are covered under the GLB Act.
53. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-69, § 350, 113 Stat. 986, 1025–26 (1999) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–
2725 (2000)).
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gime we consider would limit the sharing of personal information
across corporate affiliates within the same organization, as well as
with third parties. Affiliate sharing of personal information is a key
issue in proposed amendments to the GLB Act and in proposed leg-
islation in many states. In essence, the debate centers on whether
separate affiliates under a single corporate umbrella should be
treated as third parties. At present, most U.S. privacy laws (including
the GLB Act) do not apply an opt-in standard to information sharing
among affiliates, but bills pending in Congress and at the state level
propose to do so, and ordinances adopted by local municipalities have
already done so.54
The irony in the proposed opt-in amendments to the GLB Act is
that the Act itself was predicated on the concept that many financial
services could be offered at lower cost to consumers if provided by af-
filiated companies under a single corporate umbrella, rather than
kept separate by artificial limits on the scope of services that could be
provided by a single company.55 Accordingly, the privacy provisions
of the GLB Act established tiered consent rules regarding the sharing
of personal financial information.56 The GLB Act requires financial
institutions to offer customers a mechanism to opt-out of data sharing
with third parties, but does not give consumers the option to limit the
sharing of such information across the institution’s corporate affili-
ates, or its partners in joint marketing agreements.57
The rationale for putting fewer limits on data-sharing among af-
filiates reflects two significant considerations. First, the responsible
sharing of information among affiliates creates demonstrable benefits
for the customer, as illustrated by the examples below. Second, as a
practical matter, consumers expect different divisions of the same
54. See supra notes 9, 12 and accompanying text.
55. See GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY FIN. MODERNIZATION ACT, H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-
434, at 151 (1999), reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 245, 245–46 (setting forth the purpose of the
legislation as eliminating many barriers to creating affiliations between various financial service
providers); S. REP. NO. 106-44, at 3–6 (1999) (explaining that combining the sectors of the fi-
nancial services industry into one organization will serve customers better than the current sys-
tem, which maintains divisions between the various sectors).
56. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 503(b), 113 Stat. at 1439.
57. Separately from the GLB Act, the 1996 amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act
do require companies to offer their customers a chance to opt out of having credit report infor-
mation acquired for one purpose from being shared across affiliates for other purposes. Con-
sumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, §§ 2401–2422, 110 Stat. 3009-
426, 3009–426 to 3009–454 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (2000)). This provision
does not restrict a company from sharing its own transaction experience with the customer
among its affiliates.
CATE IN FINAL READ.DOC 07/30/03  2:51 PM
764 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:745
company to know them and to offer services and benefits based on
that knowledge. A consumer’s decision to do business with a com-
pany carries an implicit approval (and expectation) of information-
sharing under the corporate umbrella. This is true whether the affili-
ate is a credit card division of a bank or the auto servicing division of
a major retail store chain. The expectation of information-sharing is
especially true if affiliates are all operating under the same brand
name, such that the affiliate distinction is invisible to the consumer
(and often even to company employees).
Corporations organize themselves into divisions that may or may
not exist as separately owned affiliates for a variety of reasons in-
cluding federal and state tax laws, licensing rules and insurance regu-
lations. For these and other legal reasons, MBNA Corporation is or-
ganized into the affiliated subsidiary units listed below.58
• MBNA America Bank, N.A. The principle subsidiary of
MBNA Corporation, MBNA America is a national bank
with $87.7 billion in managed loans.
• MBNA Europe. This subsidiary issues credit cards in the
United Kingdom and Ireland.
• MBNA Canada. This subsidiary issues credit cards in Canada
• MBNA Insurance Agency, Inc. Markets and services credit-
related Life and Disability, personal Property and Casualty,
and Life and Health insurance products.
• MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc. Maintains and operates tele-
phone sales facilities to support account acquisition and
cross-sell consumer loan, deposit and insurance products; fa-
cilities are located in Delaware, Florida, Maine, Maryland,
New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Texas.
• MBNA Hallmark Information Services, Inc. Provides infor-
mation technology support and services to MBNA America
bank and its affiliates; headquartered in Texas.
• MBNA.com. The online division of MBNA Corporation; al-
lows customers to access their account information, apply for
new credit products, shop for other products and services,
plan and finance travel, and open deposit accounts.
58. MBNA CORP., supra note 14, at 85.
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An affiliate opt-in regime would restrict the sharing of personal
information about prospects and customers across these corporate di-
visions, all of which operate under the MBNA brand name and under
its direct management, despite the fact that customers are likely un-
aware of the legal distinctions that make certain divisions “affiliates.”
3. Opt-In Regime Three—Blanket Opt-In. In the most restrictive
of the three scenarios we consider, opt-in consent would be required
for any internal use of personal information subject to exceptions
specified in the law (such as for collecting debts, performing re-
quested services, or providing product recall and safety notices). Ex-
amples of this form of opt-in can be found both in the United States
and abroad. The FCC adopted this type of opt-in system when it pro-
hibited telephone companies from using information about their cus-
tomers’ calling patterns for marketing new services without first ob-
taining those customers’ explicit consent.59 The European Union’s
Data Protection Directive also mandates such a system.60 The impact
of blanket opt-in will obviously depend upon the scope of information
uses for which opt-in consent is required (and the companion list of
exemptions), but blanket opt-in limits what a business or other or-
ganization can do with information it already legally possesses.
B. The Differential Impact of Opt-In Versus Opt-Out
Proponents of opt-in claim that requiring explicit consent for the
use of personal information gives consumers greater privacy protec-
tion than an opt-out system.61 But, in fact, both opt-in and opt-out
give consumers the final say about whether their personal informa-
tion is used. Neither approach gives individuals greater or lesser
rights than the other. Under both systems the customer makes the fi-
nal and binding determination about data use. However, there is a
59. Telecommunications Carriers’ Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and
Other Customer Information, 63 Fed. Reg. 20,326, 20,327 (1998).
60. European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 10, art. 7.
61. Consumer Protection: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002), 2002 WL 31105436 (statement of the Honorable Mike Hatch, At-
torney General, State of Minnesota); id. (statement of James M. Kasper, North Dakota House
of Representatives); Internet Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and
Transp., 107th Cong. (2001), 2001 WL 771617 (statement of Marc Rotenberg, Executive Direc-
tor of the Electronic Privacy Information Center); id. (statement of Jason Catlett, President and
CEO, Junkbusters Corp.); Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2001), 2001 WL 338574 (statement of Ed
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group).
CATE IN FINAL READ.DOC 07/30/03  2:51 PM
766 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:745
stark difference between the opt-in and opt-out systems in terms of
their cost.
A pipeline analogy is helpful in thinking about how opt-in versus
opt-out rules affect the flow of personal information through the
economy. An opt-out system sets the default rule governing use of
personal information to “free flow.” In essence, opt-out presumes
that consumers do want the benefits (greater convenience, wider
range of services, and lower prices) facilitated by a free flow of infor-
mation, and then allows people who are particularly concerned about
privacy risks to remove their information from the pipeline. In con-
trast, an opt-in system sets the default rule to “no information flow,”
under the presumption that consumers harbor greater concern about
the risk of information usage than the loss of benefits consequent to
shutting off the flow. Under an opt-in system, those benefits evapo-
rate unless consumers explicitly grant permission for information
about them to flow in the pipeline.
By setting the default rule to “no information flow,” an opt-in
system restricts the information lifeblood on which today’s economic
activity depends. Companies that seek to use personal information to
enter new markets, target their marketing efforts, and improve cus-
tomer service must restore the information flow by contacting one
customer at a time to gain their individual permission to use informa-
tion. Consequently, an opt-in system for giving consumers choice over
information usage is always more expensive than an opt-out system.
Opt-in requires that every consumer be contacted individually to gain
an explicit consent. In contrast, opt-out is less costly because it infers
permission if consumers do not explicitly object. Information about
consumers who are either indifferent about the usage or for whom it
matters so little as to not be worth the trouble of responding remains
in the pipeline.
How large a drag does an “explicit-consent” system impose on
economic efficiency? According to the U.S. Postal Service, 52 percent
of unsolicited mail in this country is never read.62 If that figure trans-
lates to opt-in requests, then more than half of all consumers in an
opt-in system would lose the benefits or services that could result
from the use of personal information because the mandatory request
for consent would never receive their attention. Moreover, even if an
unsolicited offer is read, experience with company-specific and indus-
62. Briefs, CIRCULATION MGMT., May 1999, http://www.circman.com/ar/marketing_
briefs_7/index.htm (referring to the U.S. Postal Service’s 1997 household diary study).
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try-wide opt-out lists demonstrates that less than 10 percent of the
U.S. population ever opts out of a mailing list—often the figure is less
than 3 percent.63 Indeed, the difficulty (and cost) of obtaining a re-
sponse of any sort from consumers is the primary drawback of an opt-
in approach.
Under an opt-out system, the failure of consumers to respond
does not limit either the use of information about them in the market
or the benefits that flow from such use. Under opt-in systems, how-
ever, the failure to respond makes the collection and use of personal
information illegal in the absence of explicit consent. To the extent
that consumers do not respond to requests for opt-in con-
sentwhether due to the failure to receive or read them, lethargy,
confusion, or the competing demands of modern lifetheir inaction
amounts to a total prohibition on the collection and use of informa-
tion about them.
In addition, because opt-in requires specific, individual contact
with each consumer, such a system imposes higher costs that may
make the proposed use of information, and the services and products
that depend on that use, economically untenable even for those con-
sumers who would have opted in. In 1997, U.S. West (now Qwest
Communications), one of the largest telecommunications companies
in the United States, conducted one of the few affirmative consent
trials for which results are publicly available. In that trial, the com-
pany sought permission from its customers to utilize information
about their calling patterns (e.g., volume of calls, time and duration of
calls, etc.) to market new services to them. The direct mail appeal for
permission received a positive response rate between 5 and 11 per-
cent for residential customers (depending upon the size of a com-
63. Internet Privacy, supra note 7 (statement of Fred H. Cate, Professor, Indiana University
School of Law—Bloomington).
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panion incentive offered by the company).64 Residential customers
opted in at a rate of 28 percent when called about the service.65
When U.S. West was actually communicating in person with the
consumers, the positive response rate was three to six times higher
than when it relied on consumers reading and responding to mail.66
But even with telemarketing, the task of reaching a customer is
daunting. U.S. West determined that it required an average of 4.8
calls to each consumer household before they reached an adult who
could grant consent.67 In one-third of households called, U.S. West
never reached the customer, despite repeated attempts.68 In any case,
many U.S. West customers received more calls than would have been
the case in an opt-out system, and despite repeated contact attempts,
one-third of their customers missed opportunities to receive new
products and services.69 The approximately $20 cost per positive re-
sponse in the telemarketing test and $29 to $34 cost per positive re-
sponse in the direct mail test led the company to conclude that opt-in
was not a viable business model because it was too costly, too diffi-
cult, and too time intensive.70
Undoubtedly, explicit consent is easier to obtain in some settings.
For example, online requests for consent that require a response prior
to advancing into a website reduce the nonresponse problem, al-
though there is mounting evidence that consumers click through these
notices without reading them in an effort to obtain the desired prod-
ucts and services. However, direct mail response rates and the very
few publicly available studies of telemarketing opt-in campaigns sug-
gest that a broad-based opt-in system would be so costly as to pose a
64. Telecommunications Carriers’ Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and
Other Customer Information, 63 Fed. Reg. 20,326, 20,330 (1998); Brief for Petitioner and Inter-
venors at 15, U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-9518) (“[T]he out-
bound mail campaign produced affirmative consents in the range of 6–11%. The offering of in-
centives appeared to have no material impact on the frequency with which consents were
provided.”); Ex parte letter from Kathryn Krause, Senior Attorney, U.S. West, to Dorothy
Attwood, Senior Attorney, Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications Division at 11
(Sept. 9, 1997), in the proceeding In re Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(on file with the Duke Law Journal).
65. U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1239 n.12 (10th Cir. 1999). Interestingly, when an
opportunity to consent was presented to the customer at the conclusion of a call that the cus-
tomer initiated, 72 percent opted in. Id. at 1239.
66. Ex parte letter from Kathryn Krause to Dorothy Attwood, supra note 64, at 9–10.
67. Id. at 10.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 10–18 (evaluating the results of an affirmative consent trial).
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significant risk to the flow of personal information that supports com-
petition and commerce in the United States.
Consequently, for analytical purposes in the following Part, we
assume that each opt-in regime effectively blocks the affected forms
of data sharing. That is, we assume that the response to opt-in re-
quests would be too small and costly to make the collection and sub-
sequent distribution of such data economically viable. Depending
upon the specific data context, this may or may not be a strong as-
sumption. However, the advantage is tractability of the analysis. By
posing the issue this way, we can assess the impact on the operations
of the business units we study if certain categories of data currently in
use were to become unavailable (versus being devalued to some in-
termediate degree in terms of accuracy, depth, currency, etc.). Conse-
quently, the resulting discussion illustrates the benefits at risk should
opt-in be broadly applied without implementing ways for even indif-
ferent consumers to register their opinions at little or no cost to them-
selves.
III.  THE IMPACT OF OPT-IN ON MBNA
PRODUCTS, SERVICES AND CUSTOMERS
The following examples illustrate how each of the three opt-in
regimes described in the prior Part would affect both MBNA and its
customers. At the outset we note that MBNA does not derive reve-
nue streams from selling information about its customers to third par-
ties. Rather, it purchases information from third parties, gathers in-
formation from its own affiliates, and makes extensive use of that
data to identify those consumers to whom offers of credit cards and
other products should be made. Consequently, broad-based opt-in
rules impact MBNA by restricting its ability to collect and use it to
deliver products and services to customers and prospects. The exam-
ples below do not catalog all the effects of various opt-in laws. In-
stead, they have been selected to illustrate the broad and often subtle
impact that a rule as seemingly innocuous as requiring affirmative
consent can have on businesses and consumers alike.
A. Impact on Affinity Cards, Customers and Prospects
Any of the opt-in regimes would substantially increase the cost to
MBNA of booking new credit card accounts, result in more defaults
on credit accounts, increase the cost of providing credit cards, and
threaten the company’s economic viability.
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1. Acquisition of Member Lists. MBNA’s core product is the af-
finity card tailored for and marketed to each of more than 4,700 af-
finity groups. As discussed in Part II, the foundation of MBNA’s af-
finity strategy is access to the member lists of each of its affinity
organizations. This marketing partnership with thousands of member
organizations nationwide makes MBNA unique among major credit
card issuers and accounts for much of the company’s superior finan-
cial performance and reputation for outstanding customer service.
However, in the absence of an explicit joint-marketing exception in
an opt-in law, a third-party opt-in regime could effectively end
MBNA’s unique direct marketing approach by sharply limiting an or-
ganization’s ability to share its member list.71 One result could be that
no new affinity programs would be created for the benefit of the or-
ganization’s members, and existing programs would wilt over time,
because acquisition of new member names and addresses would be
subject to the opt-in requirement. Had a third-party or blanket opt-in
statute existed twenty years ago, MBNA likely would not have built
account base around the affinity marketing strategy.
2. Culling Prospect Lists to Target Solicitations. Like all major
credit card issuers, MBNA uses personal information to increase the
chance that its credit card offer will reach an interested and qualified
customer. This process greatly reduces the number of solicitations
that must be sent to achieve a given target volume of new accounts,
thereby reducing the cost of account acquisition. It also reduces the
volume of junk mail in the form of card offers sent to consumers who
are not qualified. Third-party or affiliate opt-in systems would elimi-
nate MBNA’s access to a significant portion of the information that it
currently uses to identify which individuals on the member lists it re-
ceives would be good prospects for a given credit card or other prod-
uct. A blanket opt-in system applicable to marketing activities would
impose similar limits.
71. In light of U.S. West’s and other companies’ experience with affirmative consent trials,
it seems unlikely that many of the 4,700 organizations that currently offer their members an
MBNA affinity card product would incur the costs of soliciting affirmative consent from their
customers or members. Of course, some or all of those costs could be passed along to the com-
panies (including MBNA) with which the affinity organization negotiates marketing agree-
ments. But, the result would be to drive up the cost of new account acquisition for those compa-
nies, possibly by several multiples, relative to the existing environment in which member lists
can be legally exchanged. This would neutralize much of the advantage of the affinity marketing
strategy.
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The MBNA direct mail marketing operations obtain and con-
sider about 800 million consumer “leads” during the course of a
year.72 The vast majority of these leads are names that appear on af-
finity group member lists (e.g., university alumni groups and profes-
sional associations), or names of consumers who are customers of in-
stitutions that have endorsed MBNA’s credit card product. Because
this is an annual figure, many names appear more than once because
the individuals are on more than one list acquired during the course
of a year, or may be considered in conjunction with a specific group’s
marketing campaign several times during the year.73 The most credit-
worthy names among them may receive multiple solicitations during
the year.
MBNA does not wish to mail to all names on the list. Not all are
equally likely to respond to a solicitation, nor will all meet the credit
underwriting standards for a particular card product. In 2000, the
MBNA direct marketing budget supported approximately 400 million
mailings of card offers.74 The challenge to the company in managing
the acquisition of new accounts is to cull the “lead list” of 800 million
prospect names to identify and target the 400 million direct mail so-
licitations to consumers who are most likely to become new cardhold-
ers. Generally speaking, MBNA has developed a set of targeting cri-
teria such that names reaching the final mailing list of 400 million: (1)
are most likely to respond to the offer and the use of the credit card,
and (2) are most likely to meet MBNA’s creditworthiness standards
for the card.
MBNA prepares hundreds of distinct solicitations throughout
the year for its various affinity groups. As part of the targeting proc-
ess for each new solicitation, the prospect list is scrubbed via compari-
son to a series of “suppression files” that the company maintains and
routinely updates. These files pull information about either individu-
72. Interviews with MBNA marketing executives, in Wilmington, Del. (Dec. 11, 2000 and
Apr. 6, 2001) (on file with the authors).
73. Think of the 800 million names on the company’s annual master lead list as the sum of
all the separate member-prospect lists obtained from each affinity organization during the
course of a year. Duplication on consecutive versions of the same organization list is actually
desirable. Most prospect names remain candidates for solicitations multiple times during a year
because circumstances that make them likely cardholders continually change. For example, a
customer who appears too risky to solicit in February may have a substantially improved credit
profile by September. Similarly, a prospect who declines a solicitation one month may be inter-
ested in a new card nine months later. Consequently, the company will end up screening 800
million names during the course of a year to develop its targeted mailings.
74. Interviews with MBNA marketing executives, supra note 72.
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als or addresses from a variety of internal and external data sources.
A few examples of the specific criteria illustrate the process.
Use of public records. The company builds and maintains a list of
business addresses and prison addresses that it uses to pare the
“prospect” list. In large part these address lists are acquired from ex-
ternal sources. These screens result in about one million names being
dropped from the annual prospect list.75 Another one million names
may be eliminated after being matched against a file of deceased in-
dividuals obtained from external public record sources.76 Altogether,
perhaps twenty million names are suppressed based on all kinds of
public record information obtained externally.77
Response modeling. Like most direct marketers, MBNA has de-
veloped proprietary response models that help it determine which
customers are likely to respond to offers for a credit card, or a card
with particular features. These models are based on the company’s
past experience with solicitations, and were developed from analyses
of the demographic and credit characteristics of those who have ac-
cepted past card offers versus those who did not respond. For these
models to be useful, MBNA must gather some demographic informa-
tion from external sources about its prospects. The models use this in-
formation to gauge the likelihood of response. Those least likely to
respond are dropped from the list. Removing the likely nonrespon-
ders would reduce the prospect list by another forty-five to fifty mil-
lion names.78
Creditworthiness. Likelihood that a cardholder will repay, of
course, is another key component of a well-targeted credit card solici-
tation. MBNA’s large national portfolio gives it credit history infor-
mation for many of the consumers on the prospect list because they
already have another card or loan account with the company. For a
variety of credit-related reasons, including past or current delin-
quency, or high existing balances outstanding relative to payment
ability, typically another 100 to 120 million names will be eliminated
from the prospect list because they do not meet MBNA’s underwrit-
ing standards for a particular card offer. The individuals dropped
from the target list exhibit a higher risk of delinquency or probability
of a loss at the time the solicitation mailing is prepared than those
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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who remain on the list.79 Credit information can also identify those
consumers who, due to their extraordinary creditworthiness, are
probably solicited frequently by card issuers and are consequently not
likely to respond to yet another offer. Perhaps another twenty to
twenty-five million names fall into this category of “unlikely to re-
spond” and are dropped.80
The bottom line from the culling process is that approximately 40
percent of the eight hundred million names are suppressed.81 The ini-
tial lead list is typically reduced by an additional 10 percent through a
combination of eliminating duplicate records, suppressing undeliver-
able addresses, and dropping customer names that appear on various
“do not mail” lists that record customer preferences not to be solic-
ited.82 This last point will be addressed in greater detail below. The
approximately four hundred million names remaining on the lead list
receive targeted direct mail offers with the endorsement of the affin-
ity group to which they belong.
Both third-party and affiliate-sharing opt-in regimes would dra-
matically limit MBNA’s ability to access the information necessary to
determine which of the eight hundred million “leads” it receives are
appropriate candidates to receive card offers. So even if a third-party
opt-in regime exempted the exchange of organization member lists
through some type of joint-marketing exception, opt-in rules would
still impose costs on both MBNA and consumers by reducing the
availability of the other external and internal data upon which the
company relies to refine its targeted marketing.
For purposes of this case study, we worked with MBNA analysts
to estimate the likely impact of various opt-in rules on its ability to ef-
fectively target its offers to prospective cardholders. For analytical
purposes, we assume that opt-in rules prevent the company from us-
ing three categories of information that it normally uses to screen
prospect lists. Specifically, we assume that third-party and affiliate
79. Because of its heavy reliance on the affinity group member lists to identify prospects
and its large existing portfolio, MBNA is unusual among major credit card issuers in that it does
not make extensive use of prescreening (as authorized under FCRA) to identify creditworthy
customers. MBNA indicated that only about 25 percent of all direct mail offers are prescreened
by credit bureaus. In part this is also due to its underwriting practice, also unusual in the indus-
try, of manual (as opposed to automated), judgmental review of each application that is re-
turned, a process that presumably includes pulling credit bureau information at that time.
80. Interviews with MBNA marketing executives, supra note 72.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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opt-in rules (1) prevent MBNA from accessing data from companies
that collect and sell public record information, (2) eliminate MBNA’s
sources of external demographic information on prospects, and (3)
block the utilization of credit information about a prospect who also
held another MBNA account unless that credit information was
based exclusively on the customer’s handling of the MBNA account.
That is, MBNA could use only its own experience with that customer,
but could not use information it might have on that customer based
on a credit report, such as balances with other creditors or a bureau-
based risk score.83
MBNA’s proprietary response models indicate that its use of in-
formation in these three categories to cull likely prospects accounts
for approximately a 19 percent reduction in names from the annual
prospect list.84 In other words, by targeting offers under current rules,
about 150 million names on the prospect list during the course of a
typical annual solicitation cycle do not receive solicitations, because
the direct mail piece would otherwise reach a consumer who was ei-
ther not interested or not qualified for the card product.
The loss of the information used to cull these names from the
prospect list blurs the company’s view of likely prospects. After the
culling process under the opt-in scenario, approximately 550 million
names would remain, instead of 400 million under the current rules.
Lacking the information necessary to further distinguish good pros-
pects from poor prospects, the company’s targeting efficiency would
be impaired.
MBNA would have two choices. It could increase its direct mail
volume to send solicitations to all 550 million names remaining on the
prospect list after the culling process, or it could arbitrarily remove
150 million names from the list after the culling process so that its di-
rect mail volume remained unchanged at 400 million. Under either
scenario, approximately 27 percent of the solicitations (150 million of
550 million) would go to consumers who were less interested in,
and/or less qualified for, the offer, and who would have been dropped
from the target list had MBNA been allowed to access and use the in-
formation on which its presently relies under current privacy rules.
83. As previously noted, current FCRA rules require companies to give customers the
chance to opt out of having information from their credit report shared across corporate affili-
ates. We are assessing the impact of a shift in the FCRA rules to an opt-in regime.
84. Interviews with MBNA marketing executives, supra note 72.
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Under the expanded-mailing option, 150 million solicitations
would go to consumers who would have been eliminated from the
target list had MBNA been permitted to use the best information
available. The resources devoted to the extra mail volume are essen-
tially wasted purely as a result of artificial limits on MBNA’s access to
more complete information about its prospects. Some unqualified
prospects would undoubtedly respond, so MBNA would also incur
the extra cost of receiving, reviewing and ultimately rejecting these
applications.
Alternatively, suppose that MBNA chooses to leave the direct
mail volume unchanged at four hundred million pieces. Without more
precise targeting information, MBNA must randomly select 400 mil-
lion prospects from the 550 million names on the list. The probability
of selecting a less qualified prospect onto the final mailing list is 0.273
(150 million out of 550 million). Consequently, we would expect that
out of the 400 million recipients of the resulting card offers, 109 mil-
lion (27.3 percent) will be consumers who would otherwise have been
excluded for lack of interest or qualifications. Significantly, this also
means that another 109 million consumers who should have received
the solicitation (i.e., who the available information would have pre-
dicted were both interested in and qualified for the offer), miss out on
the opportunity to learn about the product or service. And, the exclu-
sion of these 109 million likely prospects means that the average
quality (as measured by expected profitability) of the responses re-
ceived by MBNA will fall.
Applying the known response and approval rate factors for each
of the formerly screened groups, we worked with MBNA analysts to
calculate that the net converted rate (percentage of individuals re-
ceiving an offer who actually become new cardholders) under the opt-
in scenario would fall by 18 percent. This results in a 22 percent in-
crease in the direct mail cost per account booked.85
Although MBNA’s actual response rate and cost per account
booked is proprietary, we can illustrate the impact of the decline by
utilizing the credit card industry average response rate to direct mail
85. Let C1 = current cost per account booked, M = Total direct mail marketing budget, and
X = number of accounts booked. Then, C1 = M/X. The MBNA simulation revealed that the per-
cent of prospects receiving offers who actually become new cardholders would fall by eighteen
percent under the opt-in scenario. Consequently, the accounts booked under the opt-in
scenario = .82X. Let C2 = M/.82X = cost per account booked under the opt-in scenario. Then
C2 = C1 /.82 = 1.22C1.
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solicitations for 2000, which was 0.6 percent.86 For every 100 million
solicitations mailed to individuals under the opt-in scenario, only 492
thousand new accounts would be booked, as compared to 600 thou-
sand if the offers were targeted under existing rules, an 18 percent re-
duction in new accounts for the same expenditure on direct mail so-
licitations. Of course, the higher cost per account booked is borne not
only by MBNA, but by MBNA’s customers as well, in the form of
higher prices, reduced benefits, diminished service, and higher accep-
tance standards for new credit products.
But, the negative impact does not stop there. Regardless of
whether MBNA’s response to opt-in is to mail more solicitations or
mail the same number to a less-targeted prospect list, under either
scenario, the recipient group of four hundred million individuals
will—on average—be more risky and less profitable than MBNA’s
target group reached under the current rules. As a result, MBNA’s
delinquency and charge-off rates will rise, relative to its current expe-
rience, thereby imposing additional costs that will be passed along to
all of MBNA’s customers. Card usage will also be affected by booking
cardholders who are less likely to use the card.
In a simulation using MBNA’s proprietary data on average card
balances, finance charges and operating expenses (based on the com-
pany’s current experience with new accounts), we determined that the
first five years of account activity for the cohort of new accounts gen-
erated annually under the opt-in scenario would generate an 8 per-
cent reduction in net income before taxes, relative to the more pre-
cisely targeted group acquired under existing rules.87 It is important to
note that this cost only measures the impact of opt-in on the credit
card account acquisition component of MBNA’s business, and does
not reflect the impact on cross-selling opportunities or customer
service. Examples of how opt-in affects these activities are discussed
in the next Section.
To summarize, third-party and affiliate opt-in would raise by 22
percent the cost to MBNA of booking a new credit card account via
direct mail. In addition, because offers would be sent to customers
86. According to BAIGlobal, Inc., a widely cited source of credit card marketing data
based in Tarrytown, New York, card issuers mailed 3.543 billion card solicitations in 2000, with
a response rate of 0.6 percent. Press Release, BAIGlobal, Credit Card Mail Volume Hits All
Time High in 2000, as Response Rates Decline to New Low (Mar. 15, 2001), at http://
www.baiglobal.com/Archives/2001/PRO301.htm
87. Authors’ analysis of MBNA’s proprietary financial simulation models (on file with the
authors).
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less interested in using the card as well as higher risk customers, third-
party opt-in would cost MBNA and its shareholders approximately 8
percent of the net income earned before taxes on each new cohort of
accounts over a five-year period.
Moreover, only 130 thousand customers have responded to the
more than 30 million notices mailed by MBNA alerting them that
they could opt-out of the transfer of their credit report information
across affiliates. Just over one million customers have opted out of re-
ceiving any type of direct mail marketing offers from the company.
The move to an opt-in regime would therefore burden 98 percent of
MBNA customers with the obligation to act—to opt in—to enhance
the convenience of the 2 percent of MBNA customers who currently
opt-out. This suggests that opt-in will not only hurt MBNA’ s reve-
nues and lead to higher prices for credit, but also increase the burden
on virtually all of MBNA’s customers.
B. Impact on Cross-Selling
1. Cross-Selling as Customer Service. Like most financial institu-
tions, MBNA builds value for its customers by offering them addi-
tional financial services tailored to their needs. Mass marketing of
products is being supplanted by Customer Relationship Management
(CRM), a fundamentally different approach in which customer acqui-
sition (e.g., via a credit card product) is just one stage of a long-term
relationship between a business and its customers.88
Nowhere are the advantages of CRM more keenly felt than in
the financial services industry. An Executive Vice President in charge
of the consumer credit division at Wachovia Bank wrote in 1999 that
[i]t used to be relatively simple for a skilled banker to create an ef-
fective banking experience for customers. But today there are di-
verse products, a broader geography, new technology, and new de-
livery channels. Even the best and brightest bankers cannot service
their customers in a customized manner. They must rely on informa-
88. Three realities are pushing marketers like MBNA to adopt CRM strategies. First, the
growing diversity of the U.S. population is making traditional segmentation overly complex so
that even targeted marketing campaigns are increasingly missing their mark. Second, demo-
graphic shifts have reduced the flow of new, young customers entering the marketplace, raising
the value to customer retention. Third, customers like personalized service and reward it with
continued patronage.
CATE IN FINAL READ.DOC 07/30/03  2:51 PM
778 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:745
tion to direct their efforts more effectively, to personalize the inter-
action their customers have with the bank . . . .”89
The concept of “know your customer” is at once ancient and
revolutionary. The nineteenth century shopkeeper built long-term
relationships with his customers. The storeowner knew customers
personally, could greet them, anticipate their needs, and win their
continued business. In today’s markets dominated by large corpora-
tions, relationships cannot be built around a customer contacting the
same company employee every time. Instead technology allows firms
of all sizes to collect and store information about customers at every
opportunity, and make it available to company employees in order to
personalize the service whenever they have contact with customers.
In essence, today’s company knows its customers through its data-
base.
MBNA offers a variety of financial services in addition to credit
cards, including home equity loans, closed-end installment loans, a
variety of property, life, and casualty insurance products, and various
deposit products. The company’s cross-sell challenge is to identify
which of its products would be useful to a particular cardholder. Be-
cause it never sees its cardholders, the process of getting to know its
customers in order to tailor new opportunities must rely solely on the
skillful acquisition of relevant data and the use of information tech-
nology to translate the data into products and service.
MBNA analyzes card usage patterns and appends additional in-
formation acquired from a variety of external sources as well as other
MBNA affiliates to put a face on the customer. As a simple but typi-
cal example, an MBNA affiliate may build a telemarketing campaign
to offer home equity loans to current credit cardholders. The process
would begin with a list of existing cardholders who have high balances
on their MBNA cards, and match it against an externally acquired list
of homeowners. Targeting the solicitation at homeowners avoids the
obvious waste of contacting renters for a home equity product. The
use of the high-balance cardholder list reduces the likelihood of con-
tacting a cardholder with no current need or interest in tapping a
home equity product. Presumably, credit information on the current
cardholder (either based on MBNA experience or possibly credit bu-
reau information) would be applied to screen for creditworthiness,
89. Beverly B. Wells, At Wachovia, Customer Focus Means Information-Driven Continu-
ous Relationship Management, 21 J. RETAIL BANKING SERVICES 33, 34 (1999).
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which reduces the potential ill will associated with the company of-
fering a product to an existing customer and later rejecting them.
How would the opt-in regimes impact this home equity offer?
Opt-in for third-party sharing would limit the availability of the ex-
ternally acquired homeowner list. Opt-in for affiliate sharing would
limit the ability of the credit card affiliate to share the prospect list
with the home equity affiliate. And blanket opt-in applicable to mar-
keting would restrict MBNA’s ability to use any customer informa-
tion to cross-sell. All three regimes would sharply reduce MBNA’s
ability to get the right offer to the right cardholder. Nascent CRM ef-
forts would be crippled, and cross-selling would revert to the bygone
days of blind mass-marketing, generating a higher percentage of of-
fers to unqualified or uninterested consumers.
If the low response rate and potentially high annoyance factor
among current cardholders prevented such a marketing campaign
from being launched, many cardholders would miss the opportunity
to even learn about a useful product. In the example above, custom-
ers who maintain high balances on their credit cards would miss the
opportunity to reduce both their monthly payments and their interest
rate with lower-rate home equity loans.
MBNA’s diverse activities offer other examples of lost opportu-
nities to customers as a result of an opt-in applied to affiliate sharing.
For example, MBNA will occasionally do direct marketing of closed-
end consumer finance loans to consumers who have been rejected for
credit cards. The company’s ability to find a way to serve that cus-
tomer, even if not with a credit card, would be impaired if opt-in lim-
ited the ability to transfer the rejection list data across the affiliates
participating in building the offer.
Consider the reverse situation. Currently, the company has the
ability to coordinate new offers with the activities of other affiliates.
So, for example, the credit card unit can suppress direct mail offers to
individuals who have recently been declined by the consumer finance
affiliate. Because the approval criteria for consumer finance loans is
typically less stringent than for the credit card products, the company
already knows that the customer is unlikely to be approved for a new
card. The ability to suppress such names saves the irritation to the
consumer (and ill will toward the company and possibly the affinity
organization) from soliciting a customer one has already turned down
and knows one will turn down again.
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2. The Impact on Efficient Corporate Organizational Structure.
A separate but important dimension of opt-in’s impact on MBNA’s
cross-selling activities deserves mention. An opt-in rule for affiliate
sharing would limit MBNA’s ability to telemarket its cardholders for
any product or service because the company’s call centers are admin-
istratively housed within a separate affiliate.90 Consequently, the data
needed to assemble and screen the prospect list could not be trans-
ferred from the other company affiliates without the customer’s ex-
plicit permission. To overcome this problem, the obvious solution
would seem to be to reorganize the company’s administrative struc-
ture to bring the telemarketing unit back into the credit card affiliate,
making opt-in consent unnecessary. Of course, this perfectly legal
move highlights the inherently arbitrary nature of opt-in limits on the
movement of data across affiliates.
The practical implications are more complex. The existing corpo-
rate structure was not chosen by accident. Like many service organi-
zations, MBNA located its telephone sales call centers (which handle
outbound telemarketing) in areas where labor is plentiful and skilled,
and labor costs are relatively low. The company maintains telemar-
keting call centers in states such as Texas, Maine, New Hampshire,
Ohio and Florida.91 However, if the telemarketing centers were ad-
ministratively part of the credit card affiliate, then locating the tele-
marketing centers in a variety of states other than where the credit
card affiliate was headquartered (Delaware)92 would open the credit
card unit to tax, licensing and regulatory exposure in multiple juris-
dictions. Consequently, to capture the advantages of both lower op-
erating costs and lower administrative costs, the existing administra-
tive structure was adopted to set up the telemarketing and card-
issuing units as separate affiliates. Of course, although the savings to
the company are significant, both the administrative structure and its
rationale are invisible to MBNA’s customer.
Nevertheless, if an opt-in regime restricted its ability to move
data from the credit card affiliate to the telemarketing affiliate,
MBNA would be forced to administratively move the telemarketing
unit back into the card division (being unwilling to operate without a
telemarketing function). But, the threat of multiple-state tax and
90. MBNA Marketing Systems is the affiliate that administratively houses all telemarket-
ing operations. MBNA CORP., supra note 14, at 85.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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regulatory liability could force the company to physically move the
telemarketing unit back to Delaware, and to incur relocation costs,
disruption to services, and lost efficiency over the long term, as well
as lost jobs in the vacated communities.
C. Impact on Efforts to Prevent and Detect Fraud and Identity Theft
Like all major financial institutions, MBNA invests heavily in
preventing and detecting credit card and other forms of financial
fraud. The single most important tool in that fight is personal infor-
mation. For example, MBNA monitors account activity to determine
unusual or out-of-the-ordinary charges. Through sophisticated com-
puter models, and access to a wide range of information from many
sources about “normal” charging patterns, MBNA can spot unusual
charges that may indicate a card has been stolen or an account has
been taken over by an identity thief. Many MBNA customers report
that they first learn of a missing card or fraudulent activity when an
MBNA Customer Service representative calls to verify unusual
charges.93
MBNA also monitors account activity to apprehend criminals
perpetrating fraud. Close monitoring can identify patterns of activity
that help law enforcement officials track down crime syndicates, fraud
rings, and other sophisticated, organized efforts to defraud the com-
pany and its customers.
MBNA uses data from across its affiliates to identify suspicious
behavior, watch for identity thieves who attempt to open multiple ac-
counts in the names of other people, and prevent people who are de-
linquent on one MBNA account from inappropriately opening other
accounts with the company to cover their shortfall. Data about identi-
fied thieves is shared among affiliates to help reduce losses and pro-
tect customers, employees, and shareholders.
With fifty-one million customers, MBNA receives thousands of
change-of-address notices every day.94 Most involve routine moves,
but a few reflect the efforts of an identity thief to take over an exist-
ing account by changing the address to which statements are sent. By
accessing directory information from public records and third parties,
MBNA can verify a change of address to see if it matches any known
93. Interviews with MBNA Security Unit, in Wilmington, Del. (Dec. 11, 2000) (on file with
the authors).
94. Id.
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address of the account holder. If not, MBNA can inquire further to
determine whether the change is legitimate.
Each MBNA unit makes extensive use of information from its
own accounts in the fight against fraud, and shares information across
affiliates to gather a more complete picture of charging patterns, tar-
get troubled accounts, warn of known identity thieves, and ensure
that customers are served both efficiently and safely when changing
address or updating account information. MBNA also relies heavily
on third-party data to verify addresses and other information, spot
abnormal charges, prevent and detect fraud, and apprehend perpetra-
tors. All of these efforts require ready access to personal information
from both internal and external sources. Any form of opt-in re-
gimewhether it applied to third parties or affiliateswould degrade
the effectiveness of those efforts.
Even if an opt-in regime specifically exempted the use of per-
sonal information for antifraud uses, the reality is that many of the
external sources of information that MBNA uses to prevent and de-
tect fraud could be seriously diminished (if not eliminated) by broadly
applied opt-in rules. Few such data sources are assembled only for
antifraud purposes or paid for only by such uses. The data and sys-
tems that support antifraud uses also serve other purposes, which
help cover the cost of collecting and maintaining the information. For
example, the records used to verify addresses are affordable precisely
because they are used for a variety of marketing purposes.95 These
95.  The most sophisticated systems on the market for identifying individuals (i.e., ensuring
that someone purporting to be John Doe is indeed John Doe) are “relationship databases.” (We
are aware of at least two companies, Experian, Inc. and Acxiom, that drive a variety of commer-
cial identity-related applications from such databases.) Such databases assemble a wide variety
of information (including age, social security number, previous addresses, etc.) in order to amass
a knowledge base against which to evaluate new pieces of information. See generally Rajiv Kohli
& Jatinder N.D. Gupta, Strategic Application of Organizational Data Through Customer Rela-
tional Databases, J. SYS. MGMT., Oct. 1993, at 22. If a name, address, and social security number
combination does not exactly match the information on file, a relationship database can com-
pare the new information against the collection of past information and determine the prob-
ability of a match. Cf. U.S. Patent No. 6,523,041 (issued Feb. 18, 2003) (describing an Acxiom
data linking system). The deeper the knowledge base, the more reliable the match. These data-
bases are built from billions of pieces of information collected mostly for commercial purposes
and assembled to support a variety of commercial applications. See Acxiom Corporation,
HOOVER’S COMPANY PROFILE DATABASE, LEXIS (2003) (“[Acxiom’s] database of information
encompasses more than 95% of the nation’s households.”). Fraud prevention is but one of
them. When one piece of information is no longer available (e.g., date of birth), the ability to
evaluate new information and verify identity with a given degree of precision is degraded. Thus,
an opt-in statute like the 1999 amendments to the Drivers Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §
2721 (2000), (which has all but eliminated state motor vehicle records as a source of age and
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other uses subsidize the fraud prevention and detection services.
Permitting their use in connection with antifraud measures, although
using an opt-in regime to restrict their use for those other, economi-
cally important uses, is tantamount to preventing access altogether.
CONCLUSION
The practice of offering consumers a choice over many uses of
their personally identifiable data is now well accepted in both the
public policy and business communities. If a way could be devised
such that consumers could register their preferences regarding per-
sonal data usage at no cost to themselves or to businesses, then the
debate over whether to impose an opt-in versus opt-out rule would
largely disappear. However, in the absence of a costless method of
registering consumer preferences, an opt-in system remains signifi-
cantly more restrictive than an opt-out system, because nonresponse
is treated as disapproval, even if it arises from consumer inattention
or indifference to the choices.
The preceding case has demonstrated a variety of ways in which
a move to opt-in would impact a large financial services firm. We
have considered the imposition of three types of opt-in rules: third-
party data sharing, affiliate-sharing and blanket opt-in, which restricts
use of data a company already possesses. Based on prior experience,
we assumed for analytical purposes that a move to opt-in would effec-
tively block the affected forms of data sharing. That is, we assumed
that the positive response to opt-in requests would be insufficient to
make the collection and subsequent distribution of such data eco-
nomically viable. We then examined the impact on MBNA’s opera-
tions if certain categories of data currently in use were to become un-
available.
To briefly summarize the impact on MBNA, we found that man-
datory opt-in requirements on MBNA’s operations would impair
MBNA’s affinity group business model, raise account acquisition
costs and lower profits, reduce the supply of credit and raise credit
card prices, generate more offers to uninterested or unqualified con-
sumers and raise the number of missed opportunities for qualified
consumers, and impair efforts to prevent fraud and identity theft.
date of birth data) has significant ripple effects because it degrades the value of such databases.
18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(11) (prohibiting, with certain exceptions, the distribution of personal infor-
mation obtained as part of the motor vehicle record unless “the State has obtained the express
consent of the person to whom such personal information pertains”).
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A third-party opt-in rule would drastically affect MBNA’s cen-
tral business model that has built a cardholder base of over 50 million
customers around the affinity marketing strategy. Access to member
lists for organizations such as professional associations and alumni
groups allows MBNA to identify likely cardholder prospects and tai-
lor a product for them that builds on their affinity for the organiza-
tion. This strategy implodes with loss of access to member records. Of
course, a joint-marketing exception to a third-party opt-in rule could
be written to preserve access to such member lists. But, the need to
do so reinforces the point that broadly applied opt-in rules can un-
dermine relationships and widely accepted marketing practices that
have brought benefits to millions of American consumers. More gen-
erally, a public policy approach of writing exceptions into broad-
based opt-in rules in an attempt to preserve certain practices clearly
runs the risk of overlooking some beneficial relationships.
Opt-in would also raise account acquisition costs and lower prof-
its. Target marketing efficiency deteriorates under opt-in rules. Both
third-party and affiliate-sharing opt-in regimes would dramatically
limit MBNA’s ability to acquire and use the information necessary to
determine which of the 800 million annual “leads” it receives are ap-
propriate candidates to receive card offers. By reducing its ability to
cull prospect lists, these opt-in rules would boost MBNA’s cost-per-
account-booked via direct mail by 22 percent. Moreover, the accounts
booked would have lower revenues and higher losses relative to the
more precisely targeted group, yielding an 8 percent reduction in net
income over the first five years of experience.
Because opt-in restrictions of the type analyzed above would im-
pact all credit card issuers (not just MBNA), the reduction in supply
(from both incumbent firms and new entrants) consequent to higher
production costs would inevitably impact all cardholding consumers
through higher prices, limits on card features or reduced access to
credit cards. Part I presented evidence of a dramatic drop in credit
card interest rates between 1990 and 1993 consequent to the influx of
new competitors. The friction imposed by opt-in restrictions would
begin to reverse that trend. Simulating the impact on credit card in-
terest rates is beyond the scope of this paper. However, to gain some
perspective on the stakes, consider that if the adoption of opt-in re-
strictions limited competition and new entry such that average credit
card interest rates rose even 1 percentage point (100 basis points), it
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would cost consumers approximately $5 billion in additional finance
charges annually.96
Not all of the additional costs imposed by opt-in would be finan-
cial. All of the opt-in scenarios considered in this case study would
reduce the targeting accuracy of credit card solicitations. More con-
sumers would receive offers in which they were not interested and for
which they are not qualified, resulting in a higher incidence of junk
mail and higher rejection rates on card applications. In addition, each
of these opt-in regimes impairs MBNA’s ability to implement effec-
tive Customer Relationship Management, and cross-sell other finan-
cial services. Consequently, consumers would miss opportunities for
products and services that they might value.
Broad-based opt-in laws would pose a significant risk to the
antifraud efforts of all credit card companies, even if written to ex-
empt the specific use of personal information to prevent and detect
fraud. Much of the external information on which MBNA and other
companies rely may no longer be available under broadly applied opt-
in rules. Uses of such information for a variety of commercial pur-
poses make it economically feasible to create the databases that are
later tapped in conjunction with antifraud efforts. MBNA and all of
its customers would be harmed if opt-in rules led to shrinkage of
those databases and subsequent dilution of MBNA’s effectiveness at
preventing fraud.
The irony is that MBNA already offers customers opportunities
to limit the company’s use of their personal information. As of the
end of 2000, about 130 thousand customers had opted out of having
their credit report information transferred across MBNA affiliates.
Over one million customers had opted out of receiving any type of di-
rect mail marketing offers. Because these customers have their pref-
erences respected under the current privacy rules, it suggests that an
opt-in regime to accomplish the same purpose is unnecessary, as well
as expensive and burdensome to all customers regardless of their pri-
vacy preferences.
Finally, it should be noted that although legislation may impose
practical limits on business access to personal information, it does not
96. This calculation is based on average outstandings and total interest revenue for all gen-
eral purpose credit cards in the United States for 2000. Total interest income for bank credit
card issuers (including Visa, MasterCard, Discover and American Express) in 2000 was $64.3
billion, which equaled 13.7 percent of average receivables outstanding. Peter Lucas, The Unpre-
dictable Details, in CARD INDUSTRY DIRECTORY 11 (2002).
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change the underlying value of that information. MBNA has an eco-
nomic incentive to improve its targeting efficiency in either an opt-in
or opt-out environment. Legal restrictions on the collection of useful
data simply boost the incentives to devise proxies for the attributes
the restricted data were useful for measuring. These proxies are nec-
essarily less accurate and/or more expensive (or they would have
been used in the first place), and quite possibly more intrusive and
less equitable. For example, if individually specific data is no longer
available, MBNA and other card issuers might adopt rougher proxies
for an individual’s attributes based on census tract data for the per-
son’s neighborhood.
Movement in this direction as a consequence of opt-in rules, es-
pecially in the context of credit and financial services markets, is a
step backward from the broad “democratization of credit” experi-
enced over the past generation. Opponents of targeted marketing
would do well to study the lessons learned following the implementa-
tion of statistical risk scoring in consumer credit markets. The use of
risk scoring to evaluate loan applications has garnered both over-
whelming commercial success and regulatory approval precisely be-
cause the resulting credit decision is based on an applicant’s own
credit history and past payment performance. Relative to older
“judgmental” underwriting rules, credit decisions that incorporate
risk scoring have repeatedly been shown to be more accurate (lower
losses for a given number of approvals) and more equitable in terms
of making more credit available to a wider range of consumers.
Similarly, targeted marketing of financial services toward con-
sumers uses information about each individual’s past purchasing ex-
perience to tailor future offers. Targeted solicitations and messages
liberate marketing from reliance on stereotypes that lump consumers
into categories based on socioeconomic characteristics rather than ac-
tual behavior. More precise information about consumers’ likes and
dislikes (as inferred from past shopping and buying patterns) gives
marketers an incentive to design and deliver solicitations to the mix
of prospects most likely to be interested in the offers. Businesses in-
cur lower costs of reaching interested customers. Consequently, con-
sumers enjoy greater access to new products. But, opt-in rules in the
name of privacy “protections” choke off the information flows that
make targeting possible.
